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ON I.ABOR SUPPLY, EARNINGS, SAVINGS AND CONSUMPTION:
EViDENCE FROM A SURVEY OF LOTTERY PLAYERS
IMBENS, RUBIN AND SACERDOTE
Knowledge of the effect of unearned income on economic behavior of individuals in gen-
eral, and on labor supply in particular, is of great importance to policy makers. Estimation
of income effects, however, is a difficult problem because income is not randomly assigned
and exogenous changes in income are difficult to identify. Here we exploit the randomized
assignment of large amounts ofmoney over long periods of time through lotteries. We carried
out a survey of people who played the lottery in the mid~ighties and estimate the effect of
lottery winnings on their subsequent earnings, labor supply, consumption and savings.
We find that winning a modest prize (á15,000 per year for twenty years) does not af-
fect labor supply or earnings substantially. Winning such a prize does considerably reduce
savings. Winning a much larger prize (~80,000 rather than ~15,000 per year), reduces labor
supply as measured by hours, as well as participation and social security earnings; elastic-
ities for hours and earnings are around -0.20, and for participation around -0.14. Winning
a large versus modest amount also leads to increased expenditures on cars, and larger home
values, although mortgages values appear to increase by approximately the same amount.
Winning á80,000 increases overall savings, although savings in retirement accounts are not
significantly affected.
The results do not vary much by gender, age or prior employment status. There is some
evidence that for those with zero earnings prior to winning the lottery there is a positive
effect of winning a small prize on subsequent labor market participation.1. INTRODUCTION
Knowledge of the effect of income on economic behavior in general, and on ]abor supply
in particular, is of great importance to policy makers. For example, in his introduction
to a discussion of the negative income tax experiments, Morrill, Assistant Secretary for
Planning and Evaluation in the Depaztment of Health, Education and Welfare during the
[Vixon administration, wrote regarding the debate over effects of extending cash assistance
to the working poor: "Central to this debate has been the question of labor-supply of such
families. Would the receipt of assistance payments cause them to work less, or in some cases,
quit work altogether?" (Morrill, 1974, p. 156). Estimation of income effects, however, is
complicated by the fact that realistic amounts of income are almost never randomly assigned
and exogenous changes in income are difficult to identify. In practice, researchers have often
taken spousal or property income as exogenous for the purpases of estimating income effects.
In this paper we address the problem of identifying exogenous variation in unearned
income by exploiting the randomized assignment of large amounts of money over long periods
of time through lotteries. We surveyed individuals who played the lottery in Massachusetts
in the mid~ighties, including both winners of large prizes and people who won small, one-
time prizes. We investigate the relationship between the amount won and economic behavior
es measured by subsequent earnings, labor supply, consumption and savings.
Complicating our analysis ie the finding of differences by size of prize pre-dating the time
of winning. Ruling out non-randomness of the lottery itself, we consider three sources for
these differc ~ces. First, differences in the number of tickets bought are correlated with the
likelihood of winning a prize and are aLso likely to be correlated with ~onomic behavior.
Second, our control sample of small, one-time prize winners consists solely of sesson-ticket
holders whereas our sample of winners contains both season-ticket holders and single ticket
buyers. These groups may differ in economic behavior leading to differences between the two
groups preceeding winning the lottery. Third, non-response to the survey may be correlated
1with both the amount of prize money and with economic behavior. We attempt to adjust
for these differences using a variety of statistical methods including ordinary least squares
and propensity score methods. We provide some evidence that suggests these methods in
combination suffice to remove biases due to pre-lottery differences.
We find that winning a modest prize (~15,000 per year for twenty years) does not affect
labor supply or earnings substantially. Winning such a prizedoes considerably reduce savings
in a number of categories. Winning a much larger prize (~80,000 rather than 515,000 per
year), reduces labor supply as measured by hours, as well as participation in the labor force
and socíal security earnings; elasticities for hours and earnings are around -0.20, and for
participation around -0.14. Winning a large amount relative to a modest amount leads to
increased e~cpenditures on cars, and larger home values, although mortgages values appear to
increase by approximately the same amount. Winning ~80,000 aLso incresses overall savings,
although savings in retirement accounts are not significantly affected.
The results do not vary much by gender, age or prior employment status. There is some
evidence that for those with zero earnings prior to winning the lottery there is a positive
effect of winning a small prize on subsequent labor force participation.
Based on the statístical evidence we interpret the results as estimates of the causal effect
oflottery prizes on labor supply, earnings, savings and consumption. Two caveats should be
kept in mind, however. Responses to lottery prizes need not be typical of responses to other
forms of unearned income. Of primary interest, as indicated in the first paragraph in this
section, is the response of individuals to government-provided cash assistance. In general
responses to unearned income may well differ by the source of the unearned income - what
Thaler (1990) refers to as fungibility. It is likely, however, that the response to lottery prizes
is indicative of the response to other types of unearned income such as cash assistance. In
addition, lottery players need not be representative of the population of interest. In buying
lottery tickets, they reveal an attitude to risk that differs from that of the population at
large. However, it is again likely that their response is at ]east suggestive of the response of
2the general population.
2. LITERATURE
There is a large literature concerned with estimating the effect of unearned earnings on
labor supply. See Pencavel (1986), and Blundell and MaCurdy (1998) for surveys for men,
and Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) for women. Most of the literature utilized data from
large surveys such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the National Longitudinal
Survey (NLS), or the Current Population Survey (CPS). A major theme of this literature is
the diff'iculty in constructing exogenous measures of unearned income. Often capital income,
or spousal labor income is used. In all cases the assumption that this source of unearned
income is exogenous to Iabor supply decisions of the individual is tenuous at best.
Another strand of the literature on estimation of income efíects has analyzed experimental
data with clearly exogenous determinants of unearned income. In the early seventies, several
negative income tax experiments (NIT) were conducted where selected individuals received
randomly assigned tax schedules characterized by a guarantee level combined with a tax rate.
See for example Ashenfelter (1978), Rees (1974), Bishop (1980), Stafford (1985), Moffitt and
Kehrer (1981), Watts et al (1974), and Hausman and Wise (1977). The NIT experiments
were limited in the duration of the income supplement, ranging from three to five years. It
ís therefore possible that responses to the different tax regimes do not represent long run
responses to a permanent change in regime. In fact, this limited duration has been pointed
to as a reason for the findings of small or no effects on labor supply for men. In addition,
the amounts of income randomly assigned were relatively modest. In contrast, the lottery
pays out substantial prizes over extended periods of time.
A third strand of the literature consists of a number of case studies in which large
amounts of money were allocated using distribution rules that were arguably independent
of preferences and other determinants of economic behavior. Examples of these so-called
natural experiments (see Angrist and Krueger (1998) for a survey of this literature) are
3Kreinin (1961) and Landsberger (1963, 1970), who looked at one-time war reparations paid
to Israeli citizens by the German government, Bodkin (1959, 1963), who looked at one-time
payments by the US government to selected service men after World War II, and Holtz-
Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen (1993) who looked at the effects of inheritances on employment.
In all these cases, the exogeneity of the income supplements, that is, their independence
of preferences and constraints, is still subject to debate, but much more plausible than the
assumption of exogeneity of, for example, spousal labor income or capital income.
Finally, as in the current paper, Kaplan (1985) analyzes a survey of lottery winners. Ka-
plan, however, only collected data on economic behavior immediately prior, and immediately
subsequent, to the lottery winning, and he is therefore unable to estimate long term effects
whereas we have twenty years of accurate earnings data from the social security adminis-
tration. In addition, Kaplan only surveyed people who won amounts large enough that the
prizes were paid in yearly sums, whereas we also have a control group of small, one-time
prize winners. Finally, as in many of the other natural experiment studies referenced above,
Kaplan does not have detailed data regarding the individuaLs' economic circumstances and
behavior prior to the infusion of income. Given that his response rate is considerably lower
than ours (approximately 3001o versus 50Plo in our sample), and given our results, it appears
likely that these shortcomings bias his results.
3. THE SURVEY
Our data set consists of two samples, the "winners" sample and the "losers" sample. The
relevant population for the winners sample consists of people playing the Megabucks lottery
in Massachusetts during the years 1984 through 1988 and winning a major prize. Major
prizes for the purposes of this study are prizes that are paid out in yearly installments over
twenty years. They range from ~22,000 to ~9,696,000, with the sample mean and median
equal to ~1,104,000 and á635,000 respectively.2 One implication of the yearly payment
~All prizes are in 1986 dollazs.
4feature of the lottery is that the lottery administration has a very accurate record of the
current address of these people, which enabled us to send out surveys to essentially al] people
in this population.3
The "losers" sample comes from the population of season ticket holders between 1984
and 1988 who have won at least one small, one-time prize, ranging from from ~100 to ~5,000;
we do not know for these individuals the exact amount of the prize.4 The people in this
sample are referred to as the "losers", although it should be stressed that they did actually
win small, one-time, prizes.
The survey questionnaire, provided in Appendix A, consists of three sets of questions.
The first set concerns the current (time of survey) situation of the respondent and his or
her household. These include questions regarding the Iabor market stat~s of the respondent
and spouse, their financial assets, their housing situation and expenses on their children's
education. Because of the findings in the NIT's concerning the increase in divorce rates as
a result of the payments, we aLso inquired about mazital status changes since the date of
winning the lottery. These are the outcome variables of primary interest.
Second, there aze a number ofquestions regarding the situation at the time they won their
prize in the lottery (the big prize for the winners, and the small, one-time prize for the losers).
In principle, there is no substantive interest in the answers to these pre-lottery questions. The
reason for including them in the survey is threefold. First, and most important, they assist
in making the inferences more credible. Although in principle the randomization ensures
that the different groups of winners and losers are comparable at the time of playing the
lottery, in other words that the distribution of pre-lottery variables should be independent
of the amount won, for the aforementioned reasons of differential ticket buying behavior, the
season-ticket~single-ticket buyer differences, and differential nonresponse, there may actually
3See Sacerdote (1996) for more detail on the lottery and the survey.
~The lottery does not have historical records for people winning small prizes who bought single ticketa,
or for season ticket holders who did not win anything.
5be differences between the various groups predating the prize. Similar concerns, in that case
primarily due to nonresponse, arose in the analysis of the NIT experiments (Hausman and
Wise, 1979, 1985). The variables describing the situation of the respondent at the time of
playing the lottery can be used to help adjust for such differences, and allow us to evaluate
the procedures used for these adjustments. The second reason for including the questions
concerning the individual's situation at the time of winning is to investigate the heterogeneity
of the income effects by gender, pre-lottery labor market status, and age. Finally, the
inclusion of control variables or regressors can improve the precision of the estimates, just
as in a randomized experiment.
Third, we asked respondents to suthorize the release of their social security earnings
records to us. We deliberately chose to ask for social security earnings records, rather than
inquire about earnings from the respondents directly, in order to get more accurate records
over a longer period of time. For those who signed the social security release forms we have
accurate earnings records for at least six years preceeding and six years following the time
of winning. Although we did include questions concerning spousal labor market status both
current and at the time of lottery playing, we did not ask for spousal earnings information,
out of concern for the response rates.
The survey was conducted in three stages. In July 1995, we sent out by regular mail
pilot surveys to 50 winners and 50 losers to assess response rates and various approaches to
increasing them. In July 199fi we sent out, again by regular mail, surveys to 752 winners and
637 losers. Finally, in September 1996 we send out reminders t,o 297 nonresponding winneis
and 297 nonresponding losers. The reminders were sent by Federal Express to increase the
likelihood of potential respondents paying attention to the survey. In the pilot survey and
the main mailing, respondents were offered the choice between lottery tickets with a nominal
cost of 100 dollars or gift certificates in major department stores with a nominal cost of
50 dollars. In the follow-up part of the survey, 49 winners and 49 losers received with the
survey a 10 dollar note, and were offered a check for an additional 40 dollars in exchange for
6returning the survey. The other 248 winners and 248 losers approached in the follow-up were
offered a check for 50 dollars for returning the survey. Incentive schemes where potential
respondents are paid prior to responding have been previously implemented in Philipson
(1997), who discusses the merits of such schemes in detail.
Table 1 summarizes the response rates for the different mailings. The overall response
rate is approximately 4ó010, slightly higher for losers at 499'o than for winners at 42qo. It
should be noted, however, that the follow-up mailing did not include all nonrespondents
from the previous mailing for budgetary reasons. Had we followed up on all nonrespondents
in the main mailing using the 10~o11ar~ash~40-dollar-check incentive scheme, the expected
overall response would have been (0.38 f(1 - 0.38) x 0.23) x 100oI'o- 53P1o. Consistent with
Philipson's (1997) findings, the incentive scheme with ~10 up front and a promise of á40
more rather than a promise of S50 did lead to a higher response rate (23eIo versus 16010). A
test of the null hypothesis that the two response rates are equal gives a t-statistic of 1.81,
with a p-value of 0.08.
4. THE DATA
We divide the sample into three groups. First, the "loseis", those who won a one-time
prize between 100 and 5,000 dollars. Second, the "small winners", who won a total amount
less than 500,000 dollars (in 1986 dollars), or a yearly amount less than 25,000 dollars
for twenty years: on average the people in this group won yearly prizes of 15,000 dollars
(with a standard deviation of 6,000 dollars). Third, the "big winners", who won more than
500,000 total, that is, more than 25,000 yearly for twenty years: on average this group won
approximately 80,000 dollars per year (with a standard deviation of 70,000 dollars).5 We
shall, however, also carry out analyses using the exact value of the prize using the entire
sample of winners.
SThe cutoff point for the small vs big winners sample was chaaen so the two groupa were of compareble
size.
7The reasons for dividing the winners sample into two subsamples are twofold. First,
for policy purposes, the big winners are of less interest. Few social policies involve income
transíers of this magnitude. The comparison of the small winners and the losers, on the
other hand, is potentially relevant for social policy because it involves yearly transfers that
are not out of line with existing income transfer programs. Figures 1 through 3 illustrate
this. The first figure presents a histogram of the yearly prize for all winners. For this group
the yearly prize ranges from close to zero to ~500,000. Figure 2 restricts the sample to small
winners. Figure 3 presents a histogram of social security earnings in the year prior to winning
the lottery for the subpopulation for whom these earnings were positive. For this group the
averagé earnings were 522,000 (~16,000 if we average also over those with zero eaanings),
comparable to the ~15,000 average yearly prize for the small winners. The second reason
involves the sample selection. In the introduction three sources of assocation between prizes
and pre-lottery variables were discussed. The first and second of these were differences in
number of tickets bought, and differences between the population of season ticket holders
from whom the losers were drawn and the population of winners, which includes both one-
time ticket buyers and season ticket holders, respectively. These differences do not affect the
comparison between diff'erent groups of winners, and by comparing big and small winners we
therefore eliminate both these complications and need only be concerned with biases from
differential non-response by prize.
Our basic sample for the analyses presented below consists of individuals with complete
answers to the questions on pre-lottery conditions (that is, number of tickets bought, age,
years of high school, years of college, gender, whether the individual was working at the
time of playing the lottery), and who authorized the release of their social security earnings.
This leaves us with a sample of 496 observations, 259 losers, 93 small winners and 144 big
winners. For analyses here involving additional variables (e.g., weekly hours, or savings) we
select subsamples of this basic sample with complete answers to the questions regarding the
additional variables involved. In doing so we discarded individuals who responded to some
8of the questions, and therefore possibly introduced biases or at least lost some precision.
In future work we intend to follow a more principled approach to missing data involving
modelling the nonresponse and multiply imputing the missing data (Little and Rubin, 1987;
Rubin, 1987).
Tables 2 and 3 present summary statistics for the variables used in the analyses. For
each variable the mean and standard deviation for the entire sample are given. In addi-
tion, we report the mean for the three groups (losers, small winners, and big winners) as
well as t~tatistics for the null hypotheses that the averages tor the loser and small winner
subpopulations and the small and big winner subpopulations are identical.
Overall there are substantial differences between the three groups, even prior to winning
the lottery. This highlights the need for the statistical adjustment procedures described in
Section 5. It also underlines the importance of collecting detailed pre-treatment information
when designing studies such as ours. Although the source of variation in the treatment of
interest appears completely random, complications arising from, for example, non-response
can invalidate simple comparisons.
4.1 PRE-LOTTERY CHARACTERISTICS
On average the individuals in our basic sample are 50 years old at the time of winning,
which, for the average person was in 1986. They have 3.7 years of high school and 2.0 years
of college. Of the 496 individuals 6301o are male, and 78Q1o were working at the time they
won the lottery. In principle these characteristics should not differ between the three groups,
losers, small and big winners. However, ]osers are significantly more educated than both
groups of winners, and they are also older. This is likely to reflect the differences between
season ticket holders and single ticket buyers. The fact that the differences between ]osers
and small winners are much Iarger than those between small and big winners suggests that
differential nonresponse is not as important a source of bias as the difference between season-
ticket holders and single ticket buyers. A final question regarding the situation at the time
of winning the lottery is the number of tickets bought in a typical week. Because there were
9some extremely large numbers (up to 200 tickets per week), we transformed this variable by
taking the minimum of the number reported and ten. As expected, the number of tickets
bought is considerably higher for winners (five per week for the transformed variable, nine
per week for the raw measure) than for losers (two per week according to both the raw
measure and the transformed variable).
4.2 I,ABOR SUPPLY AND EARNINGS
We observe for each individual in the basic sample social security earnings for six years
preceeding and following winning. Average earnings, in terms of 1986 dollars, rise over the
pre-winning period from ~13,930 to á16,330, and the decline back to ~13.290. For those
with positive social security earnings, average earnings rise over this period from 520,180 to
524,300. From the 496 individuals in our basic sample, 53PIo claimed to be currently working
("what were you doing most of last week?"). We also ssked for hours worked ("in a typical
week, how many hours per week do you currently work"). The average number of hours was
30.6, or 40.3 for the 76Q1o with positive hours. Note that a higher percentage claimed positive
hours ( "in a typical week" ) than claimed to be working ("most of last week" ). There was, in
fact, no-one who claimed to be working while reporting zero hours, but 12Q1o claimed positive
hours in a typica] week, while at the same time professing not to be working most of last
week. This group reported an average of 9.3 hours, compared to an average of 43.5 hours
for those who reported to be working. Regarding their spouse at the time of the survey 40010
claimed to have a spouse currently working.
4.3 CONSUMPTION AND SAVINGS
We included questions about housing and cars in the questionnaire. In both cases we
asked for the value of the houses and cais, as well as the amount of debt associated with
them. On average the value of all cars was á18,200, with an averege debt of á3,000. For
housing the average value was á166,300, with an average mortgage of ~48,800. Note that this
is averaged over the entire sample, with zeros included for the 7Qlo respondents who reported
not owning their homes. Only 12 respondents out of the basic sample of 496 did not reply
10to the housing question, so it is unlikely that the high percentage of homeowners is due to
confusing not owning with non-response.
We asked a number of questions concerning current wealth. We aggregated these into
three categories. The first concerns retirement type accounts, including IRA's, 401K plans
and other retirement related savings. The second consists ofstocks, bonds and mutual funds.
The third savings category is savings in general savings accounts and CD's.6 We construct
an additional variable adding up the three savings categories as "total financial wealth".'
For the losers, wealth in the various savings accounts is considerably higher than wealth in
housing, ~176,000 versus ~144,000. The distributions of these financial wealth variables are
very skewed, with for example wealth in mutual funds for the 414 respondents ranging from
zero to á1.75 million, with a mean of ~53,000, a median of 510,000 and 3501o zeros. In the
analyses below we therefore transform the four savings categories as s- log(S f 1) where S
is savings in 1000's of 1986 dollars.e
Finally, we asked respondents for savings rates out of "your and your spouse's total
after-tax income" both actual for the current year and planned for the next year.9 Average
reported savings rates are 11.801o for the current and 13.Oolo for the next year. Thus on
average respondents planned to save 1.2 percentage points more next year than this year,
significantly different from zero with a t-statistic of 4.8. Sixteen percent intended to increase
savings rates for next year, against only two percent who planned to reduce savings. We
sSee the appendix with the questionnaue for the exact formulation of the questions.
7To reduce the e6ect of item-nonresponse for this last variable, total financial wealth, we added zeros
to all missing savings categoriea for those people who reported pasitive savings for at least one of the
categories. That is, if someone reports positive savings in the category "savings accounts and CD's", but
did not answer the question for mutual funds, we impute a zero for mutual funds in the construction oFtotal
financial wealth. For the 462 observations on total financial wealth, zeros were imputed for 27 individuals
for ret'vement savings, for 48 individuals for mutual funds, and for 27 individuals for general savings. As
a result, the average of the three savings categories does not edd up to the average of total savings, and
the number of observations for the total savings variable is larger than that for each of the three savinga
categoriea.
sAn alternative would be to model separately the probability of savings being equal to zero and the
distribution of savings conditional on it being positive.
9The question about next year's savings plans was suggested to us by David Laibson.
11generally interpret these intended savings rates as a less than perfect measure of actual future
savings rates.
5. SELECTION BIAS AND ANALYSES
Here we briefly describe the analyses carried out on this rich data set and the selection
issues that necessitate them. For a large number of outcomes (e.g., earnings, hours worked),
we are interested in the average response as a function of the yearly prize. If prizes had
been randomly assigned to the people in our sample, simple comparisons of outcomes by
prize would have provided unbiased estimates of these functions. However, such simple
comparisons are unlikely to lead to credible estimates of the causal effect of winning a prize
in light of the pre-lottery differences documented in Tables 2 and 3.
5.1 SELECTION BIAS
The 6rst reason that the simple comparison by prize won does not lead to credible esti-
mates of the average causal effect of winning the lottery is that the randomization is over
lottery tickets and not over the population of interest. Even if everybody in the population
bought at most one lottery ticket, the randomization would no longer be over the popula-
tion at large, but it would still correspond to randomization over a subpopulation, namely
that of lottery players. However, different people buy different numbers of lottery tickets.
Suppose for example that there are two types of lottery players. The fiist type buys a single
lottery ticket every single drawing. The second type buys two tickets every drawing. If we
randomly draw from those tickets that won a small prize, the second type of person would
be twice as likely to be drawn. This effect is likely to explain most of the statistically highly
significant differences in number of tickets bought between losers and winners, as presented
in Table 2. There is aLso some evidence that the number of tickets bought is correlated with
characteristics of the individuals. For example, the correlation between years of college and
the number of tickets bought is -0.20, with a t-statistic for the null of zero correlation equal
to -4.5. Within the sample of winners the correlation is smaller at -0.06, with a t-statistic of
12-l.o.
This effect does not explain any differences in the number of lottery tickets bought by prize
for winners. If the probability of winning is equal for all lottery tickets, and if the probability
of winning two prizes that are paid out over twenty years is ignored, then conditional on
winning such a prize, the amount of the prize should not be correlated with the number of
tickets bought. As shown in Table 2, we do not find a significant difference between small
and big winners.
However, in principle there may be more complicated ways in which ticket buying be-
havior biases simple comparisons. As in many lotteries, the payout rate in Megabucks varies
from drawing to drawing depending on previous payouts. There is much anecdotal evidence
that the prospect of an eacceptionally large prize draws additional lottery players. In the
end this effect may lead to a positive or negative correlation between the number of tickets
bought and the payout rate and thus with the prize. It is unlikely, however, that such effects
are substantial.
The second reason for biases is the difference in the population from which the losers and
the population from which the winners were drawn. The former is the population of season
ticket buyers, whereas the latter includes both single ticket and season ticket buyers.lo This
difference may explain much of the difference in background characteristics in Tables 2 and
3. For example, we find that losers are significantly older, more highly educated, and earn
more money than winners. This source of bias cannot explain any of the difference between
small and big winners as both come from the same population.
The final source of bias is the differential nonresponse. If the likelihood of responding to
the survey depends on the amount won and on pre-lottery variables that are correlated with
post-lottery outcomes, simple comparisons of post-lottery outcomes by prize would not lead
to unbiased estimates of the average causal effects even in the winners sample. There are
loWe do not know whether a winner is a season ticket buyer or a single ticket buyer. We do know that
most of the winners are single ticket buyers, although we do not know the e~cact mix.
13two pieces of evidence supporting the hypothesis that differential nonresponse is potentially
an important problem. First, we do find significant differences predating the lottery by prize
within the winners sample that cannot be attributed to the previously discussed biases.
Second, since we do know for all individuals, respondents or non-respondents, the prize won,
we can directly investigate the correlation between response and prize. Such a non-zero
correlation is a necessary condition for nonresponse to lead to bias. The t-statistic for the
slope ccefficient in a logistic regression of response on the logarithm of the yearly prize is
-3.5 (the response rate goes down with the prize), lending credence to this argument.
5.2 ANALYSES
The key assumption we make to account for the selection biases discussed in the previous
section is the unconfoundedness assumption (Rubin, 1978; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Ho]-
land, 1986), related to the assumption of selectàon on obseruables (e.g., Heckman and Robb,
1984) that implies that, within subpopulations defined by pre-lottery variables, differences
in outcomes by prize are unbiased estimates of the average causal effect of the prize for that
subpopulation. The plausibility of this assumption clearly depends on the richness of the set
of observed pre-lottery variables. In Appendix C we provide some evidence on the adequacy
of this assumption. Given the unconfoundedness assumption, we would like to, in principle,
report estimates of the entire response function, adjusting for all differences in pre-lottery
variables by calculating averages within cells defined by the the pre-lottery variables. This
is obviously not feasible, given the limited sample size and the number of conditioning vari-
ables. We therefore focus on two sets of readily interpretable summary measures. First, we
estimate the effect of a pair of discrete changes in the prize, first the effect of a change from a
yearly prize of zero to 15,000 dollars and second the effect of a change from 15,000 to 80,000
dollars. To avoid reliance on a single method of inferencé, and to assess robustness of the
results, we estimate these two effects in a variety of ways. Second, we report the elasticities
implied by these estimates.
For the effect of a change from zero to 15,000 dollars we use the sample of 259 losers and
1493 small winners for a sample size of N~ 352. First we estimate this effect using a dummy
variable for winners using ordinary least squazes regression. Since the small winners win on
average 15,000 dollars a year, we interpret the estimated coefficient on the dummy variable
as an estimate of the effect of winning 15,000 dollars. Second, we use propensity score
methods (See, e.g., Rubin and Rosenbaum, 1983, 1985; Dehejia and Wahba, 1998) to adjust
for pre-lottery differences. In Appendix B we discuss the implementation of the propensity
score methodology in more detail. The propensity score estimates tend to have less reported
precision than the least squares estimates, reflecting both the reliance on linearity of the
odinary least squares methods, and the imbalance between the different groups. Our third
set of estimates are based on a linear regression with the yearly prize as a regressor, and
the pre-lottery variables as additional regressors. We report the coefficient on the prize,
multiplied by 15,000 to get the effect of a 15,000 dollar increase in prize.
To convert the estimates of the response to a discrete change from a prize of zero to
15,000 dollars into an elasticity we first divide by the difference in average prizes (15,000
for small winners versus 0 for losers) to get an estimate of the effect per dollar, and then
multiply by the ratio of average prize (6,600 for the smal]-winners~loseis sample) to average
response to get an estimate of the percentage change in the response to a percentage change
in the yearly prize.
The covariates for the analyses involving losers and small winners consist of the following
nineteen variables defined at the time of winning the ]ottery: number of tickets bought (as
before, with numbers larger than ten replaced with ten), age at time of winning, gender,
years of high school, years of college, year of winning, labor market status at the time of
winning, earnings for each of the six years preceeding the year of winning and indicators for
positive earnings for each of those six years.
For estimating the effect of a change from 15,000 to 80,000 dollars, we use the winners
sample (93 small winners and 144 big winners for a total sample of N- 237). Again we
estimate the effect of interest using a dummy variable regression, as well as by regressing the
15response on the actual size of the prize. The distributions of pre-lottery variables are much
closer for these samples, as shown in the summary statistics in Tables 2 and 3, and differences
between least squares and propensity score estimates are therefore uniformly small, both in
estunates and in standard errors, and we only report the propensity score estimates for the
earnings variables in graphical form and the appendix. Because in this sample all prizes are
positive, we also include a regression osing the logarithm of the prize as the regressor. In
each case we report both the estimated effect and the corresponding elasticity.
The control variables for the estimate based on the winners sample are the same as
those from the small-winners~losers sample with the exception that only earnings in the
one year immediately prior to winning is used, both in level and as an indicator for these
earnings being positive, leaving us with nine pre-lottery variables. We dropped earnings
from the five additional pre-lottery yeats because of the smaller sample size and because the
differences between the different groups of winners are smaller than the differences between
small winners and losers. Appendix C reports some evidence to support the robustness of
the estimates to the inclusion of these variables.
None of these analyses take account of the specific nature of the outcome variables. Many
of the outcome variables are binary, and others have very skewed distributions, often with
many zeros. Analyses taking such features into account may lead to more precise inferences
and we intend to pursue them in future work.
We also report elasticities for various subpopulations. These are based on linear regres-
sions with the amount of the prize won and interactions with various variables. For example,
to estimate the elasticity for men and women, we estimate a linear regression of the depen-
dent variable with on the right hand side: the level of the prize, the same pre-lottery variables
as before (which includes a dummy for men), and an interaction of the male dummy and
the level of the prize. From the estimated regression function we calculate elasticities for
men and women, evaluated at the same average prize and response. We base these estimates
on the linear regressions with interactions rather than on separate analyses for the different
16subpopulations to increase precision.
Two caveats should be borne in mind when interpreting the estimates. First, there
may be differences between the elasticity estimates from the small-winner~loser and winners
samples. These may be due to the fact that the two samples are subject to different biases, or
because the two elasticities are estimated on very different parts of the response function. In
particular it is difficulty to imagine that an increase in the prize from 1,000 to 2,000 dollars
per year would lead to the same proportional response as an increase from 50,000 to 100,000
dollars per year. Even if the elasticity were constant as a function of all unearned income, it
is likely that lottery winnings are a higher proportion of unearned income for the big winners,
leading to a lower estimate of the elasticity for the small-winner~loser sample. A second issue
concerns the comparison of estimates of the same effect or elasticity estimated on the same
sample using different estimation methods. Consider, for example, the estimates of the effect
of a discrete change based on a dummy variable regression or on a linear regression with
the actual prize. The results may differ because of nonlinearity of the response function,
or because of the differential susceptability to outliers. Here it is useful to recall that the
distribution ofyearly prizes is highly skewed. The yearly payout ranges from 1,000 to 500,000
dollars per year, with the mean and median equal to 56,000 and 32,000 dollars respectively.
The few observations with very large prizes will be very influential in the linear regressions
with actual prizes but less so in the dummy variable regressions.
G. LABOR SUPPLY AND EARNINGS
Tables 4 and 5 presents results for for the small winners~loser sample and winners sample
respectively. The labor supply variables are self-reported weekly hours, and self-reported own
and spousal labor market status at the time of the survey. The earnings variables are social
security earnings for the year of winning and six years after winning the lottery.
6.1 LABOR SUPPLY
In the small winners~losers sample the estimates of the effect of winning 15,000 are an
17increase in hours of 0.2 (based on the propensity score estimates), 1.6 (based on the dummy
variable regression) and 0.1 hours (based on the yearly prize regression). None is statistically
significantly different from zero. The implied estimates of the elasticities are between 0.00
and 0.01, again very close to zero.
In the winners sample a change from a yearly prize of á15,000 to a yearly prize of ~80,000
is estimated to reduce hours by 9.3, 4.2, and 8.7, based on the dummy variable, yearly prize
and log yearly prize regressions respectively. Implied estimates of the elasticities are -0.25,
-0.11, and -0.17. All estimates are significantly different from zero with t-statistics around
3.5.
How do these estimates relate to those reported in the literature? Pencavel (1986) and
Blundell and MaCurdy (1998) report estimates of the marginal propensity to earn out of
nonwage income, or the total income elasticity. This elasticity is equal to the product of the
elasticity of hours with respect to unearned income and the ratio of earned and unearned
income. lf we take the lottery income to be the sole source of unearned income, and ignore
the topcoding for social security earnings, we can calculate this as the ratio of average social
security earnings and average yearly prize, for the losers~small-winners sample approximately
equal to 3.6, and for the winners sample approximately equal to 0.27. It may be that this is
somewhat of an underestimate of this ratio, with 17qo of the winners at the topcoded value.
We find estimates of the elasticity with respect to unearned income, using the winners sample
ranging from -0.11 to -0.25. Using the ratio of average earned income to average unearned
income of 0.27, this gives an estimate of the total income elasticity of -0.03 to -0.06, with
standard errors around 0.01. These estimates are at the low end of, but not out of line with,
the estimates reported by Pencavel and Blundell-MaCurdy surveys.~~
Next consider estimates of the effect of winning on the probability of participation. The
first measure of participation is an indicator for positive hours. Based on this measure,
the effect of winning ~15,000 is estimated to be between 0.04 and 0.06 respectively, with
~~This is not particularly surprising given the wide range of estimates in the literature.
18implied elasticities between 0.01 and 0.02. None ofthese estimates is statistically significantly
different from zero. In the winners sample the effect of winning ~80,000 rather than ~15,000
per year is estimated to reduce the probability of positive hours by -0.17, -0.06, and -0.13 for
the three different estimation procedures. The implied elasticities are -0.18, -0.06 and -0.11
respectively. All three estimates are highly significant. In each case the elasticities are about
two thirds of the corresponding elasticities for hours, suggesting that a substantial number
of people adjust their labor supply to the new source of income by reducing hours without
entirely withdrawing from the labor force.12
We also investigate the effect on participation through the "what were you doing most
of last week" question. For the small-winners~losers sample we find again that none of the
estimates are significantly different from zero. The estimates of the effect of a 80,000 rather
than a 15,000 dollar prize suggest larger reductions in the probability of working than those
based on the hours question. For this sample the elasticities range from -.18 to -.48, all three
significantly different from zero.
Finally, consider the effect on spousal Iabor supply. We find no evidence of any effect
of lottery winnings on the labor supply of the spouse. Neither the estimate of the effect of
a 15,000 dollar increase, nor the estimate of the effect of an increase from 15,000 to 80,000
dollars is significantly different from zero. The estimated elasticities range from -0.09 to
0.05. The benefits of lottery prizes in terms of increased leisure appear to accrue mainly to
the winner of the prize, rather than be shared among members of the household. This is
somewhat surprising, given Massachusetts law that would regard lottery prizes as community
property and the common presumption that family behavior can be modeled using a single
family utility function and budget constraint (e.g., Ashenfelter and Heckman, 1974)
6.2 FiARNINGS
Using social security earnings records we can trace the effect of lottery winnings from
1~HoIt~Eakin, Joulfaian and Roaen similarly find that inheritances lead to reduction in labor eupply for
those who do not withdraw entirely from the labor matket.
19the year in which the prize was won to the sixth year following the prize. In Tables 4 and
5 estimates of the effect on average earnings and on the probability of positive earnings
for the two samples are reported. Estimates of the effect of winning 15,000 rather than
zero dollars per year on social security earnings vary accross estimation methods but are
not significantly different from zero. Winning 80,000 rather than 15,000 dollars per year
reduces earnings by an amount that is both economically and statistically significant. This
reflects both lower participation and lower earnings per worker with positive earnings. For
example, the estimated earnings elasticity six years after winning is -0.41 for the estimate
based on the dummy variable regression, -0.20 for the regression baserj on the actual prize
and -0.29 for the regression based on the logarithm of the prize. In the sixth year following
the prize, the estimated elasticities of participation as measured by positive earnings are
-0.30 for the dummy variable regression, -0.16 for the prize regression, and -0.23 for the log
prize regression. In each case these elasticities are approximately 75oI'o of the corresponding
earnings elasticities.
The elasticities, both for earnings and for participation markedly increase in absolute
value as time since winning passes. In the first full year after winning, the estimated elas-
ticities of earnings are -0.22, -0.18, and -0.23, rising (in absolute value) in the fourth year to
-0.49, -0.24, and -0.38, suggesting it takes a while for individuals to adjust fully to their new
budget constraint.
The estimates of the effect of changes from 0 to á15,000 and from ~15,000 to 580,000
are also reported in Figures 4-7. The solid lines present 95oI'o confidence intervals based on
propensity score estimates, and the dashed lines present 95e1o confidence intervals based on
least squares estimates. These figures demonstrate the suhstantial differences in reported
precision between the more robust propensity score and more model-dependent least squares
estimates for the loser~small-winner sample, and the broad agreement between the two
estimates for the winners sample.
Overall it appears that modest changes in unearned income do not affect labor supply
20very much, whether directly measured by hours, or indirectly measured by social security
earnings. It is only with changes in unearned income larger than most government programs
that we see clear and sizeable reductions in hours, participation rates and social security
earnings.
7. CONSUMPTION AND SAVINGS
Tables 4 and 5 also report results for the consumption and savings variables, for the
small-winners~losers and big~small-winners samples respectively.
7.1 CARS, CAR DEBTS, HOUSING AND MORTGAGES
Winning ~15,000 rather than ~0 appears to have little effect on expenditures on cars or
housing. There is some evidence that debt for cars and houses goes up somewhat, but given
that the value of cars and houses does not go up, the implication that net value of cars and
houses would actually go down appears unlikely.
Winning ~80,000 rather than ~15,000 affects housing and car values considerably. The
value of cars rises sharply, on average by between á5,500 and ~8,000 dollars, roughly 30oI'o of
average car values, depending on the estimator used, with an estimated elasticity of around
0.30. Car debts do not seem to be affected, leaving the net car value to rise by almost the
same amount, with again an elasticity of around 0.30. For housing the story is different.
The value ot houses also goes up, by about á30,000 on average, out of average house prices
around ~166,000, but mortgages also go up, by about á20,000. Both these changes are highly
significant, but the difference, the effect on net housing values, is not significantly different
from zero. The estimated elasticities for gross housing values are around 0.16, those for debt
around 0.27, and those for net housing values around 0.08.
7.2 WEALTH AND SAVINGS RATES
Reported values of savings in various accounts are significantly affected by winning the
lottery. Winning á15,000 rather than ~0 considerably reduces the amount held in retirement
accounts, in bonds and mutual funds, and those in general savings. Estimated elasticities
21for the total of these three categories are estimated to be between -0.12 and -0.31 depending
on the estimator. These reductions are supportive of models that attach importance to the
precautionary savings motive. During the twenty years that the respondents are receiving
lottery payments, there would appear to be little reason for precautionary savings. Given the
average age of the respondents, around fifty years at the time of winning, however, it is not
necessarily inconsistent with life-cycle models to find that savings reduce sharply in response
to the windfall income. In all cases these reductions in savings are highly significant. In
contrast to accumulated savings, reported savings rates are not affected by winning ~15,000
rather than á0. One possibility is that people do not accurately report savings rates. This
is in line with the fact that many report planned savings rates for next year that excced
savings rates for the current year. These planned savings rates increases appear unlikely
to be accurate predictions given that not a single individual reported planning a reduction
in their savings rate. The change in savings between this year and next year is highly
correlated with winning the lottery. If one interprets the planned savings rate as the rate
that respondents feel they ought to be saving, this may reflect the respondents' view that
they are not saving enough of their lottery windfall.
A very different picture emerges for the comparison between small and big winners.
Savings in retirement type accounts still appear to have dropped slightly, although this effect
is not significant at conventional levels. However, savings in bonds and mutual funds type
accounts, as well as general savings, have gone up markedly. The estimated elasticities for
overall savings are between 0.33 and 0.51 depending on the estimator, and highly significant
in all ca.ses. Winning ~80,000 rather than ~15,000 aLso increases reported savings rates, by
around 3 percentage points (on an average reported savings rate of around l0010).
8. INTERACTIONS WITH GENDER, EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND AGE
In Tables 6-8 we reported elasticities for subpopulations by gender, employment status
prior to winning the lottery and age. In each case we estimate the regression with the actual
22amount of the prize and the interaction of the actual amount of the prize with gender,
employment status, or age, and calculate from those estimates the implied elasticities for
the various subpopulations. In addition to the elasticities and their standard errors, we
report t-statistics for the null hypothesis that the elasticities for two groups are identical, or,
equivalently, the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the interaction term is zero.
ó.l INTERACTIONS WITH GENDER
First consider the estimates based on the loser~small-winners sample, reported in Table 7.
Most of the differences between elasticities for men and women are statistically insignificant.
The exception is in the participation elasticies which are less negative for women than for
men. In fact, the estimated elasticities for men are negative in six out of the seven years,
whereas for women, the estimated elasticities are positive in six out of the seven years and
significantly so in three of the seven years. In contrast, social security earnings do not appear
to go up for women as as a result of winning ~15,000. One interpretation is that women do
not necessarily withdraw from the labor force, but rather find more attractive jobs with less
focus on wages.
The reduction in retirement account savings reported in Table 4 for the combined men
and women sample appears largely due to reduced savings for women, although the difference
with men is not statistically significant. Both men and women intend to increase their savings
rate for next year, but the increase is much bigger for men than for women.
Next, consider the estimates based on the winners sample. Both men and women reduce
their hours significantly as a result of winning large amounts of money, but the reduction is
much larger for women than for men (elasticities of-0.31 and -0.10 respectively), although the
difference is not statistically significant. It is interestíng in this respect that the elasticities
for spousal labor force participation is not significantly different from zero for either men or
women. For this sample, elasticities of earnings are larger in absolute value for women than
for men, but again the differences are never statistically significant.
238.2 1NTERACTIONS WITH EMPLOYMENT STATUS
In Table 8 results for the interaction with employment status prior to winning are re-
ported. Emloyment status is measured here as having positive social security earnings in the
year prior to winning.
First consider the losers~small-winners sample. Earnings go down more for those who
were employed prior to winning, with the estimated elasticities for those with zero earnings
prior to winning essentially equal to zero. These differences are not statistically significant.
Participation elasticities, however, differ significantly between those previously employed and
those previously not employed. Estimated elasticities for those with zero earnings prior to
winning the lottery aze positive in every year and significantly different from zero in three of
the seven years. For those with positive earnings prior to winning the estimated elastiticies
are negative in all but one year, and significantly different from zero in one year.
The reductions in savings found in Table 4 appeaz largely due to reductions in savings
by those employed prior to winning the lottery. Reductions in savings are not significantly
different from zero in any of the categories for those with prior earnings equal to zero. ln
fact, the elasticity of the current savings rate with respect to unearned income is positive
and significantly different from zero for this group.
Next, consider the winners sample. Those with positive prior earnings reduce their subse-
quent earnings much more than those with zero prior eaznings. This is not surprising because
for the latter group there is little to reduce as far as earnings aze concerned. Elasticities for
savings rates and amounts are generally similar for the two groups, with only savings in the
general savings category substantially higher for those with positive prior earnings.
8.3 1NTERACTIONS WITH AGE
In Table 8 we report elasticities by age. We estimate these using a regression function
with an interaction of the amount of the prize and an interaction with age at the time of
winning. We then calculate the implied elasticities at two age levels, 40 and 60, motivated
by the fact that the average age at the time of winning was approximately 50.
24First consider the loser~small-winner sample. None of the estimated elastiticies are sig-
nificantly correlated with age for this sample. The older winners do not appear more likely
to drop out of the labor force, or less likely to save, as might have been expected.
Next, consider the estimates based on the winners sample. Older winners are estimated
to reduce their earnings and participation less than younger winners, but as in the previous
table, this is partly a mechanical result coming from the fact that their earnings are less to
begin with. Somewhat more surprising is that younger and older winners are likely to have
similarly increased wealth. In fact the elasticities for total wealth are 0.25 at age 40 and 0.37
at age 60. In addition, the elasticities for the savings rate this year are 0.07 at age 40 and
0.24 at age 60, statistically significant at the lOQ1o level.
9. CONCLUSION
In this paper we report estimates of the effect of winning the lottery on economic behavior,
including labor supply, earnings, consumption and savings. These estimates are based on
a new survey of lottery players. We provide some evidence to support our view that these
estimates can be interpreted causally. We find that if the amount of winnings per year
is around ~15,000, there is little or no evidence that labor supply is reduced as a result.
If anything, it appears that those with zero earnings prior to winning the lottery increase
participation as a result. Although there is little effect on earnings and labor supply, it
does appear that savings are sharply reduced as a consequence of winning around á15,000,
consistent with an important role for the precautionary motive for savings.
Winning a large amount of money does lead to significant reductions in labor supply.
In addition, some of the extra income can be traced to increased expenditures on cars and
housing, as well as to increased savings. These effects appear to differ little between men
and women, or by age.
A question not addressed in this paper is how representative these results are for other
populations, or how similar the response to lottery winnings is to the response to other forms
25of unearned income. The former question can be addressed by comparing the losers sample
to more representative data sets such as the PSID or CPS. It is more difficult to see how the
second concern can be addressed with similar amounts of uneazned income.
Finally, on a methodological note, our results suggest that even in cases where the treat-
ment of interest is randomly assigned, non-response and other complications can lead to
biases in simple comparisons. Even in many of the natural experiments studies, it may
therefore still be important to use additional methods to control for differences predating
the assignment of treatment.
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Change in Savings Rate
Sample All Losers Small Winners Big Winners t-statistics
Size (N-496) (N-259) (N-93) (N-144)
mean (s.d.) mean mean mean L~SW SM~B
496 1986.2 (1.2) 1986.4 1986.0 1986.1 [-3.2] [0.9]
496 3.3 (2.9) 2.2 4.4 4.7 [8.1] [0.7]
496 3.7 (0.9) 3.9 3.5 3.7 [-3.7] [1.5)
496 2.0 (1.8) 2.6 1.2 1.5 [-6.8] [1.0]
496 0.78 (0.41) 0.77 0.78 0.81 [0.3] [0.5]
496 0.63 (0.48) 0.67 0.46 0.65 [-3.5] [2.9]
496 50.2 (13.7) 53.2 44.6 48.5 [-5.5] [2.1J
496 26.4 (50.8) 0.0 15.8 80.6 [42.4] [9.2]
414 30.6 (21.5) 30.1 37.5 26.9 [2.7] [-3.5
414 0.76 (0.43) 0.74 0.90 0.70 [3.1] [-3.4
494 0.53 (0.50) 0.54 0.71 0.39 (2.9] [-5.0
448 0.40 (0.49) 0.37 0.45 0.41 (1.3J [-0.5
473 18.2 (17.8) 16.7 14.3 23.6 [-1.3] [3.6]
413 3.0 (6.5) 1.9 3.7 4.4 [2.5] [0.7]
407 15.5 (14.9) 15.3 11.4 18.75 [-2.2] [3.3]
484 166.3 Ill.6 (174.9) 133.1 171.8 [-3.1] [2.8J
461 48.8 65.5 (33.8) 54.4 71.7 [2.8) [l.g]
460 122.1 (95.5) 144.6 83.(' 106.8 [-5.0] [2.3]
435 64.7 (102.8) 92.6 32.4 35.7 [-4.2] [0.5]
414 53.0 (126.9) 60.0 16.0 63.3 [-3.6) [2.2]
435 37.0 (67.5) 37.58 23.0 45.0 [-2.3] [1.9]
462 143.2 (]95.9) 176.7 66.6 131.6 [-4.9] [2.5]
435 2.85 (1.96) 3.38 2.19 2.33 [-4.8] (0.5]
414 2.27 (2.01) 2.67 1.08 2.31 [-6.4] [4.4]
435 2.68 (1.50) 2.81 1.93 2.90 [-4.6] [4.5]
462 4.11 (1.58) 4.49 3.11 4.06 (-7.4] [4.3]
472 0.12 (0.13) 0.10 0.10 0.15 [-0.1] [2.3)
460 0.13 (0.14) 0.11 0.13 0.17 [1.2J [1.9]
460 0.01 (0.05) 0.01 0.02 0.02 [2.5] [-0. )]
30Table 3: SUMMARY STATISTICS BASIC SAMPLE: SOCIAL SECURITY EARNINGS (IN THOUSANDS OF 'ó6
DOLLARS)
All Lasers Small Winners Big Winners t-statistics
(N-496) (N-259) (N-93) (N-144)
Variable mean (s.d.) mean mean mean L~SW SM~BW
Earnings
Earnings Year-6 13.9 (13.6) 15.6 9.8 13.7 [-3.6] [2.4]
Earnings Year-5 14.3 (14.2) 16.2 9.8 13.8 [-3.7) (2.5]
Earnings Year-4 14.3 (14.3) 16.4 9.2 13.9 (-4.1] (2.9]
Earnings Year-3 14.8 (14.8) 16.7 10.0 14.7 [-3.7] [2.9]
Earnings Year-2 15.6 (15.3) 17.6 10.9 15.1 [-3.6] [2.5]
Earnings Year-1 16.3 (15.7) 18.0 12.3 15.9 [-3.0] [2.0]
Earnings Year 0 16.3 (16.3) 18.5 12.3 14.8 (-3.1] [1.4]
Earnings Yeartl 15.6 (16.6) 18.6 12.7 11.9 (-2.9] (-0.4)
Earnings Yeart2 14.8 (16.6) 17.7 12.8 10.9 (-2.4) [-1.0]
Earnings Yearf3 14.4 (16.9) 17.5 12.9 9.9 [-2.1] [-1.6]
Earnings Yearf4 14.1 (17.2) 17.1 13.6 8.9 [-1.6] [-2.4]
Earnings Yearf5 13.8 (16.8) 16.9 12.4 9.2 [-2.1] [-1.8]
Earnings Yeart6 13.3 (16.6) 15.9 12.9 8.9 [-1.4] (-2.3]
Indicator for Pos. Eazn.
Pos. Earn. Year-6 0.69 (0.46) 0.69 0.69 0.71 [0.0] [0.3]
Pos. Earn. Year-5 0.71 (0.45) 0.68 0.74 0.74 [1.1] [0.0]
Pos. Earn. Year-4 0.71 (0.45) 0.69 0.71 0.75 [0.3] (0.7]
Pos. Earn. Year-3 0.70 (0.46) 0.68 0.72 0.74 [0.8] [0.4]
Pos. Earn. Year-2 0.71 (0.46) 0.68 0.74 0.74 (1.2] (0.0]
Pos. Earn. Year-1 0.71 (0.45) 0.69 0.74 0.74 (0.9] [-0.1]
Pos. Earn. Year 0 0.71 (0.45) 0.69 0.73 0.74 [0.8] (0.1]
Pos. Earn. Yeaz~-1 0.68 (0.47) 0.68 0.75 0.63 [1.3] [-2.0]
Pos. Earn. Yeart2 0.63 (0.48) 0.64 0.71 0.56 [1.2] (-2.3]
Pos. Earn. Yearf3 0.60 (0.49) 0.62 0.67 0.53 [0.8] [-2.1]
Pos. Earn. Yearf4 0.58 (0.49) 0.61 0.68 0.47 [1.2] [-3.2]
Pos. Earn. Yearf5 0.59 (0.49) 0.59 0.67 0.52 [1.2] [-2.2]
Pos. Earn. Yearfó 0.56 (0.50) 0.57 0.68 0.47 [1.8] [-3.2]
31C3ble 4: SMALL WINNERS AND LOSER SAMPLE (N-352), EFFECTS OF LOTTERY PRIZES ON LABOR
iUPPLY AND SOCIAL SECURITY EARNINGS (IN THOUSANDS OF 1986 DOLLARS)
Winning ~15,000 versus 0 Elasticity
Prop Score OLS(dummy) OLS(level) Prop Score OLS(dummy) OLS(level)
est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e.
Hours 0.2 (5.8) 1.6 (2.4) 0.1 (2.1) 0.00 (0.05) 0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02)
Positive Hours 0.04 (0.09) 0.06 (0.05) 0.06 (0.05) 0.01 (0.03) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02)
Working 0.08 (0.11) 0.06 (0.06) 0.02 (0.05) 0.03 (0.05) 0.03 (0.03) 0.01 (0.02)
Working Spouse 0.06 (0.10) -0.05 (0.07) -0.01 (0.06) 0.04 (0.07) -0.03 0.05 -0.00 (0.05)
Earnings 0 2.3 (2.9) -0.7 (0.8) -0.8 (0.7) 0.04 (0.04) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Earnings 1 1.2 (3.1) -2.0 (1.2) -2.1 (1.0) 0.02 (0.05) -0.03 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02)
Earnings 2 3.0 (3.1) -1.4 (1.3) -1.7 (1.2) 0.05 (0.05) -0.02 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02)
Earnings 3 2.5 (3.3) -0.7 (1.5) -1.4 (1.3) 0.04 (0.05) -0.01 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02)
Earnings 4 2.8 (3.5) -0.5 (1.8) -1.5 (1.5) 0.05 (0.06) -0.01 (0.03) -0.02 (0.02)
Earnings 5 0.6 (3.4) -1.1 (1.8) -1.4 (1.5) 0.01 (0.06) -0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03)
Eaznings 6 3.3 (3.3) 0.6 (1.8) -0.0 (1.6) 0.06 (0.06) 0.01 (0.03) -0.00 (0.03)
Pos Earn 0 -0.00 (0.11) -0.01 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) -0.00 (0.04) -0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) Pos Eazn 1 0.12 (0.11) 0.05 (0.04) 0.04 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04) 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.01)
Pos Earn 2 0.11 (0.11) 0.04 (0.05) 0.05 (0.04) 0.04 (0.04) 0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) Pos Earn 3 0.04 (0.12) 0.02 (0.05) -0.01 (0.05) 0.01 (0.05) 0.01 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02)
Pos Earn 4 0.03 (0.11) -0.01 (0.06) -0.03 (0.05) 0.01 (0.05) -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) Pos Earn 5 0.03 (0.12) 0.02 (0.06) 0.01 (0.05) 0.01 (0.05) 0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) Pos Eazn 6 0.08 (0.12) 0.08 (0.06) 0.03 (0.05) 0.03 (0.05) 0.03 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Value Cars 2.1 (4.9) -0.7 (2.3) -0.3 (2.0) -0.03 (0.08) -0.01 (0.04) -0.01 (0.03) Debt Cars 3.2 (1.4) 1.4 (0.9) 1.5 (0.8) 0.37 (0.17) 0.17 (0.11) 0.18 (0.09)
Net Value Cars -2.0 (3.4) -2.7 (2.3) -2.0 (2.0) -0.04 (0.07) -0.05 (0.04) -0.04 (0.04) Value Home 8.4 (17.5) -9.1 (17.3) -10.2 (14.9) 0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) -0.02 (0.02) Debt Home 19.2 (13.2) 17.5 (9.3) 11.9 (8.0) 0.13 (0.09) 0.12 (0.06) 0.08 (0.05) Net Value Home -8.8 (15.1) -26.0 (15.8) -22.5 (13.6) -0.02 (0.03) -0.05 (0.03) -0.05 (0.03)
Log Ret. Accts -0.69 (0.44) -0.45 (0.28) -0.25 (0.24) -0.18 (0.12) -0.12 (0.07) -0.06 (0.06) Log B~MF. -1.87 (0.47) -0.90 (0.33) -0.67 (0.29) -0.48 (0.12) -0.23 (0.08) -0.17 (0.07) Log Gen Sav -0.72 (0.37) -0.44 (0.25) -0.14 (0.22) -0.19 (0.10) -0.12 (0.06) -0.04 (0.06)
Log Tot Fin Assts -1.18 (0.33) -0.71 (0.22) -0.47 (0.20) -0.31 (0.09) -0.18 (0.06) -0.12 (0.05)
Sav. This Year 0.01 (0.03) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.01) 0.03 (0.07) 0.04 (0.04) 0.06 (0.04)
Sav. Next Year 0.01 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02) 0.03 (0.05) 0.10 (0.04) 0.12 (0.04) ~hang in Sav. Rate 0.02 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.67 (0.22) 0.72 (0.23) 0.74 (0.20)
32I'able 5: WINNERS SAMPLE (N-237), EFFECTS OF LOTTERY PRI2E5 ON LABOR SUPPLY AND SOCIAL




























Log Tot Fin Assts
Sav. This Year
Sav. Next Year
Change in Sav. Rate
Winning á80,000 versus á15,000 Elasticity
OLS(dummy) OLS(level) OLS(logs) OLS(dummy) OLS(level) OLS(logs)
est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e.
-9.3 (2.6) -4.1 (1.4) -8.7 (2.2) -0.25 (0.07) -0.11 (0.04) -0.17 (0.04)
-0.17 (0.05) -0.06 (0.03) -0.13 (0.04) -0.18 (0.05) -0.06 (0.03) -0.11 (0.04)
-0.29 (0.06) -0.11 (0.03) -0.24 (0.05) -0.48 (0.09) -0.18 (0.05) -0.28 (0.06)
0.02 (0.06) -0.04 (0.03) -0.01 (0.05) 0.05 (0.13) -0.09 (0.07) -0.02 (0.08)
-0.6 (0.8) -1.1 (0.4) -1.6 (0.6) -0.04 (0.05) -0.06 (0.02) -0.07 (0.03)
-3.2 (1.2) -2.6 (0.6) -4.5 (1.0) -0.22 (0.08) -0.18 (0.04) -0.23 (0.05)
-3.9 (1.4) -2.9 (0.7) -5.3 (1.2) -0.28 (0.10) -0.21 (0.05) -0.28 (0.06)
-4.6 (1.5) -2.6 (0.8) -5.5 (1.2) -0.36 (0.11) -0.20 (0.06) -0.30 (0.07)
-6.2 (1.6) -3.1 (0.9) -6.7 (1.3) -0.49 (0.13) -0.24 (0.07) -0.38 (0.08)
-4.5 (1.5) -2.3 (0.8) -5.0 (1.3) -0.36 (0.12) -0.19 (0.07) -0.29 (0.08)
-5.0 (1.6) -2.4 (0.8) -5.0 (1.3) -0.41 (0.13) -0.20 (0.07) -0.29 (0.08)
-o.oo (0.03) -o.oz (0.02) -o.ol (0.03) -o.oo (0.04) -0.03 (o.oz) -o.ol (0.02)
-0.13 (0.05) -0.09 (0.02) -0.15 (0.04) -0.16 (0.06) -0.12 (0.03) -0.13 (0.03)
-0.14 (0.05) -0.09 (0.02) -0.15 (0.04) -0.19 (0.07) -0.12 (0.03) -0.14 (0.04)
-o.ll (0.06) -0.08 (0.03) -0.15 (0.05) -0.17 (0.08) -0.12 (0.04) -0.16 (0.05)
-0.19 (0.06) -0.10 (0.03) -0.21 (0.05) -0.30 (0.09) -0.16 (0.05) -0.23 (0.05)
-0.13 (0.06) -0.10 (0.03) -0.18 (0.05) -0.19 (0.08) -0.14 (0.04) -0.19 (0.05)
-0.19 (0.06) -0.10 (0.03) -0.21 (0.05) -0.30 (0.09) -0.16 (0.05) -0.23 (0.05)
7.9 (2.7) 5.3 (1.4) 8.9 (2.3) 0.34 (0.12) 0.23 (0.06) 0.28 (0.07)
0.4 (1.1) 0.4 (0.5) 0.7 (0.9) 0.08 (0.23) 0.09 (0.11) 0.11 (0.14)
6.1 (2.3) 4.8 (1.1) 7.8 (1.9) 0.33 (0.12) 0.26 (0.06) 0.31 (0.07)
29.1 (13.9) 31.3 (7.0) 41.5 (11.6) 0.16 (0.08) 0.17 (0.04) 0.16 (0.04)
20.9 (9.1) 23.6 (4.5) 31.9 (7.5) 0.27 (0.12) 0.31 (0.06) 0.30 (0.07)
9.4 (10.5) 7.3 (5.4) 9.7 (8.8) 0.08 (0.09) 0.06 (0.05) 0.06 (0.05)
-0.23 (0.25) 0.01 (0.13) 0.01 (0.22) -0.19 (0.21) 0.01 (0.11) 0.00 (0.13)
0.84 (0.29) 0.58 (0.14) 1.13 (0.25) 0.71 (0.25) 0.49 (0.12) 0.67 (0.15)
0.73 (0.21) 0.37 (0.11) 0.82 (0.18) 0.62 (0.18) 0.32 (0.09) 0.50 (0.11)
0.60 (0.22) 0.38 (0.11) 0.79 (0.19) 0.51 (0.19) 0.33 (0.09) 0.48 (0.11)
0.03 (0.02) 0.03 (0.01) 0.06 (0.02) 0.23 (0.13) 0.17 (0.07) 0.27 (0.08)
0.03 (0.02) 0.03 (0.01) 0.06 (0.02) 0.16 (0.13) 0.17 (0.06) 0.26 (0.08)
-0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.09 (0.44) 0.17 (0.22) 0.23 (0.27)




























Log Tot Fin Assts
Sav. This Yeaz
Sav. Next Year
Change in Sav. Rate
Lasers~Small-Winners (N-352) Winners (N-237)
Men Women t-stat Men Women t-stat
elast. s.e. elast. s.e. dif elast. s.e. elast. s.e. dif
-0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) [-0.6] -0.10 (0.04) -0.31 (0.14) [1.5]
0.01 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) [-0.4] -0.06 (0.03) -0.17 (0.11) [1.0]
0.02 (0.03) 0.00 (0.03) [ 0.4] -0.17 (0.05) -0.25 (0.13) [0.6]
-0.03 (o.os) 0.02 (o.os) [-0.7] -o.ll (0.07) o.os (o.ls) [-o.s]
-0.02 (o.ol) -o.ol (o.ol) [-0.8] -o.os (0.03) -0.07 (0.07) [ o.o]
-0.04 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) [-0.7] -0.18 (0.05) -0.14 (0.12) [-0.4]
-0.02 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) [ 0.3] -0.22 (0.06) -0.19 (0.14) [-0.2]
-0.03 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) (-0.3J -0.19 (0.06) -0.29 (0.16) ( 0.6]
-0.02 (0.03) -0.03 (0.03) [ 0.0] -0.23 (0.07) -0.28 (0.18) [ 0.3]
-0.05 (0.03) 0.00 (0.03) (-1.2] -0.18 (0.07) -0.23 (0.18) ( 0.3]
-0.02 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04) [-0.7] -0.19 (0.07) -0.26 (0.18) [ 0.4]
-0.03 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) [-2.3] -0.04 (0.02) 0.05 (0.05) [-1.6]
-0.02 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02) [-2.6] -0.11 (0.03) -0.20 (0.08) [ 1.1]
0.01 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) [-0.4] -0.11 (0.04) -0.18 (0.09) [ 0.8J
-0.02 (0.02) o.oz (0.03) [-1.2] -o.ll (0.04) -0.21 (o.ll) [ o.s]
-0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) [-0.1] -0.13 (0.05) -0.32 (0.12) [ 1.4]
-0.04 (0.03) 0.05 (0.03) [-2.3] -0.12 (0.05) -0.27 (0.12) [ l.z]
-0.01 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) [-1.2) -0.14 (0.05) -0.26 (0.13) [ 0.9]
0.00 (0.04) -0.01 (0.04) [ 0.3] 0.22 (0.06) 0.29 (0.16) [-0.4]
0.23 (0.12) 0.12 (0.12) [ 0.8] 0.13 (0.12) -0.22 (0.32) [ 1.1]
-0.05 (0.05) -0.03 (0.05) [-0.2] 0.26 (0.06) 0.26 (0.16) (-0.0]
-0.04 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) [-1.3] 0.18 (0.04) 0.11 (0.10) [ 0.7]
0.03 (0.07) 0.12 (0.07) [-1.0] 0.32 (0.06) 0.23 (0.16) [ 0.5]
-0.06 (0.04) -0.03 (0.04) (-0.8] 0.07 (0.05) -0.01 (0.13) [ 0.6]
0.01 (0.09) -0.13 (0.08) [ 1.3] -0.03 (0.05) 0.24 (0.13) [-2.0]
-0.24 (0.10) -0.12 (0.09) [-1.1] 0.24 (0.07) 0.45 (0.19) [-1.0]
o.oo (o.oa) -o.os (0.07) [ 0.7] o.ll (0.04) 0.23 (o.lo) [-1.2)
-0.11 (0.07) -0.14 (0.06) ( 0.4] 0.07 (0.03) 0.21 (0.07) [-1.9]
0.05 (0.05) 0.06 (0.05) [-0.1] 0.17 (0.07) 0.21 (0.19) [-0.2]
0.14 (0.05) 0.09 (0.05) [ 0.9] 0.17 (0.07) 0.22 (0.19) [-0.3]
1.19 (0.25) 0.25 (0.26) ( 2.8] 0.15 (0.24) 0.29 (0.67) [-0.2]
34Table 7: ELASTICITIES BY EARNINGS STATUS PRIOR TO WINNING THE LOTTERY
Losers~Small-Winners (N-352) Winners (N-237)
Pos Earn Zero Earn t-stat Pos Earn Zero Earn t-stat




























Log Tot Fin Assts
Sav. This Year
Sav. Next Year
Change in Sav. Rate
0.00 (0.02) -0.01 (0.03) [0.3J -O.13 (0.05) -0.09 (0.05) [-O.s]
0.03 (0.02) -0.00 (0.03) [1.OJ -0.05 (0.04) -0.08 (0.04) [ 0.5]
0.03 (0.03) -0.03 (0.04) [1.3] -0.22 (0.06) -0.12 (0.08) [-1.1]
0.03 (0.05) -0.06 (0.07) [1.0] -0.12 (0.08) -0.04 (0.10) [-0.2]
-0.02 (o.ol) o.oo (0.02) [-l.o] -o.ll (0.03) -o.oo (0.04) [-z.2]
-0.04 (0.02) -0.02 (0.03) [-0.8] -0.29 (0.05) -0.02 (0.06) (-3.2]
-0.04 (0.02) -0.01 (0.03) (-0.8] -0.35 (0.07) -0.02 (0.08) [-3.2]
-0.03 (0.02) 0.00 (0.04) [-0.8] -0.33 (0.07) -0.02 (0.09) [-2.7J
-0.04 (0.03) 0.01 (0.04) [-1.1] -0.37 (0.09) -0.05 (0.10) [-2.5]
-0.04 (0.03) 0.00 (0.04) [-0.8] -0.29 (0.08) -0.03 (0.10) [-2.1]
-0.01 (0.03) 0.03 (0.05) [-0.7] -0.32 (0.08) -0.03 (0.10) [-2.2]
-0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02) [-2.4] -0.05 (0.02) -0.00 (0.03) [-1.3]
-o.oo (0.02) 0.05 (o.oz) [-l.s) -0.15 (0.04) -o.as (0.04) [-l.s]
0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.03) [-o.z] -0.17 (0.04) -0.04 (0.05) [-2.0]
-0.02 (0.02) 0.04 (0.03) [-1.7] -0.15 (0.05) -0.0? (0.06) [-0.9]
-0.04 (0.02) 0.04 (0.03) [-2.1] -0.19 (o.os) -o.lo (o.m) [-l.o]
-0.03 (0.02) 0.08 (0.04) [-2.8] -0.18 (0.06) -0.09 (0.07) [-1.1]
-0.00 (0.02) 0.05 (0.04) [-1.4] -0.21 (0.06) -0.08 (0.07) [-1.4]
0.00 (0.04) -0.02 (0.05) [ 0.3] 0.24 (0.07) 0.22 (0.10) [ 0.1]
0.25 (0.11) 0.01 (0.15) [ 1.4] 0.02 (0.15) 0.18 (0.17) [-0.7]
-0.05 (0.04) -0.02 (0.06) [-0.5] 0.30 (0.07) 0.19 (0.09) [ 0.9]
-0.00 (0.03) -0.04 (0.04) ( 0.8] 0.21 (0.05) 0.11 (0.06) [ 1.3]
0.14 (0.06) -0.05 (0.09) ( 1.9] 0.32 (0.07) 0.29 (0.09) [ 0.3]
-0.05 (0.03) -0.04 (0.04) (-0.2] 0.11 (0.06) 0.00 (0.07) [ 1.2J
-o.lo (o.os) o.ol (o.lo) [-l.o] o.os (0.14) -o.lo (o.ls) (o.s]
-0.19 (0.09) -0.15 (0.11) [-0.3] 0.53 (0.16) 0.43 (0.19) [0.4]
-0.09 (0.07) 0.07 (0.09) [-l.s] 0.47 (0.12) 0.13 (0.14) [1.9]
-0.16 (0.06) -0.04 (0.08) [-1.3] 0.41 (0.12) 0.20 (0.14) [1.2]
0.02 (0.04) 0.14 (0.06) [-1.7] 0.19 (0.09) 0.14 (0.10) [0.4)
0.10 (0.04) 0.14 (0.06) [-0.6] 0.19 (0.08) 0.14 (0.10) [0.4]
0.97 (0.23) 0.26 (0.32) ( 1.9] 0.20 (0.29) 0.12 (0.34) [0.2]




























Log Tot Fin Assts
Sav. This Year
Sav. Next Year
Change in Sav. Rate
Losers~Small-Winners (N-352) Winners (N-237)
Age 40 Age 60 t-stat Age 40 Age 60 t-stat
elast. s.e. elast. s.e. dif elast. s.e. elast. s.e. dif
-0.01 (0.02) 0.04 (0.03) [ 1.9] -0.15 (0.05) -0.07 (0.05) [ 1.4]
0.01 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02) ( 1.6] -0.07 (0.04) -0.05 (0.04) [ 0.4J
-0.01 (0.03) 0.04 (0.03) [ 1.3] -0.22 (0.07) -0.15 (0.06) [ 0.9]
0.02 (0.05) -0.05 (0.06) [-1.1] -0.17 (0.09) -0.03 (0.08) [ 1.5]
-0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) [-0.2] -0.11 (0.03) -0.04 (0.03) [2.1]
-0.04 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) [ 1.1] -0.26 (0.06) -0.13 (0.05) [2.0]
-0.03 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) [ 0.7] -0.33 (0.07) -0.14 (0.06) [2.4]
-0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.03) [ 0.3] -0.33 (0.08) -0.12 (0.07) (2.4]
-0.04 (0.03) -0.00 (0.03) [ 1.1] -0.35 (0.09) -0.17 (0.08) (1.8]
-0.04 (0.03) -0.00 (0.03) [ 1.0] -0.27 (0.09) -0.13 (0.07) (1.5]
-0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.04) [ 0.6) -0.31 (0.09) -0.13 (0.08) [1.8]
-o.ol (o.ol) -o.ol (o.ol) [o.l] -0.05 (0.03) -0.02 (o.oz) [l.z]
0.01 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) [0.9] -0.16 (0.04) -0.09 (0.03) [1.7]
o.ol (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) [0.7] -o.ls (o.os) -o.os (0.04) [2.1)
-0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.03) [0.3] -0.21 (0.06) -0.06 (0.05) [2.4]
-0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.03) (1.1J -0.24 (0.06) -0.11 (0.05) [2.0]
-0.01 (0.02) 0.03 (0.03) [1.2] -0.22 (0.06) -0.10 (0.05) [1.8]
0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.03) [0.3] -0.23 (0.06) -0.11 (0.05) [1.8]
0.01 (0.04) -0.03 (0.05) [-0.9] 0.22 (0.08) 0.24 (0.07) [ 0.2]
0.18 (0.10) 0.17 (0.13) (-0.1] 0.19 (0.16) 0.03 (0.13) [-0.9]
-0.03 (0.04) -0.06 (0.05) [-0.6] 0.22 (0.08) 0.29 (0.07) [ 0.7]
0.00 (0.03) -0.05 (0.03) [-1.5) 0.22 (0.05) 0.14 (0.04) [-1.5]
0.12 (o.os) o.oo (0.07) (-l.s] 0.34 (o.os) 0.28 (0.07) [-0.7]
-0.04 (0.03) -0.06 (0.04) [-0.6] 0.11 (0.06) 0.03 (0.05) [-1.2]
-0.10 (0.07) 0.03 (0.09) [ 1.5] -0.04 (0.14) 0.05 (0.12) [0.6]
-0.16 (0.08) -0.20 (0.10) [-0.5] 0.42 (0.17) 0.53 (0.14) [0.6]
-0.05 (0.06) -0.01 (0.08) ( 0.6] 0.25 (0.12) 0.36 (0.11) [0.8]
-0.13 (0.06) -0.11 (0.07) [ 0.4] 0.25 (0.13) 0.37 (0.11) [0.9]
0.04 (0.04) 0.10 (0.05) [ 1.1] 0.07 (0.09) 0.24 (0.08) [ 1.8]
0.11 (0.04) 0.13 (0.05) [ 0.4] 0.10 (0.09) 0.22 (0.07) [ l.3]
0.86 (0.22) 0.49 (0.27) [-1.4] 0.32 (0.30) 0.07 (0.26) [-0.7]
36Table 9: ESTIMATES OF PROPENSITY SCORE (LOGIT MODEL)
Year Won
Number of Tickets Bought
Years of High School
Years of College
Working at Time of Winning
Male













Test ïor Zero Coeff
on Earn-6 to Earn-2 X2(10)
Test for Zero Coeff
on Earn-6 to Earn-1 XZ(12)
Test for Zem Coeff
on All Slope Coeff. XZ(19)
Small-Winners~Losers Big~Small Winners
(N-352) (N-237)
est. t-stat est. t-stat
-0.30 [-1.8) -0.12 (-1.1]
0.40 [5.3] -0.01 -[0.2]
-0.42 [-2.3] -0.21 (-1.SJ
-0.63 [-5.2] -0.10 [-1.0]
0.16 [0.3] 0.03 [0.1]
-0.69 (-1.8] -0.64 [-2.OJ
















37Cable 10: SMALL WINNERS AND LOSER SAMPLE (N-352), SENSITIVITY CHECKS ON LEAST SQUARES
~STIMATES OF EFFECT OF WINNING ~15,000 VERSUS ~O ON SOCIAL SECURITY EARNINGS
Last Year Used as Pre-lottery Year
Year-6 Year-5 Year-4 Year-3 Year-2 Yeaz-1
est. t-stat est. t-stat est. t-stat est. t-stat est. t-stat est. t-stat
Year-5 -0.9 [-1.4]
Year-4 -2.6 [-2.6] -2.0 [-2.3]
Year-3 -2.5 [-2.1] -1.8 [-1.6] 0.2 [0.3]
Year-2 -3.1 [-2.3] -2.4 (-1.9] -0.6 [-0.6] -0.8 [-1.2]
Year-1 -3.5 [-2.4] -2.7 [-2.0] -0.9 [-0.7] -1.0 [-1.1] 0.4 [-0.5]
Year 0 -4.1 [-2.6] -3.2 [-2.2] -1.5 [-1.1] -1.6 [-1.4] -1.0 [-I.0] -0.7 [-0.9]
Yearfl -4.9 (-2.9] -4.1 [-2.6] -2.5 [-1.7] -2.6 [-2.0] -2.2 [-1.8] -2.0 (-1.7]
Yeart2 -4.2 [-2.4] -3.3 [-2.0] -1.9 [-1.2] -2.0 [-1.4] -1.6 [-1.1] -1.4 [-1.0]
Yearf3 -3.3 (-1.7] -2.4 [-1.3] -1.2 [-0.7] -1.3 [-0.8] -0.9 [-0.6] -0.7 [-0.5]
Yearf4 -2.8 [-1.4] -2.1 [-1.1] -0.8 [-0.4] -1.0 [-0.5] -0.7 [-0.4] -0.5 [-0.3]
Yearf5 -3.5 [-1.8J -2.9 [-1.5] -1.4 (-0.7] -1.4 [-0.8] -1.3 [-0.7] -1.1 [-0.6]
Year~-6 -1.9 [-l.o] -1.2 [-o.s] 0.2 [o.l] 0.2 [o.l] 0.4 [ 0.2] o.s [0.4]
381-zble 11: SMALL WINNERS AND LOSER SAMPLE (N-352~, SENSITIViTY CHECKS ON PROPENSITY SCORE
~STIMATES OF EFFECT OF WINNING ~15,000 VERSUS ~O ON SOCIAL SECURITY EARNINGS
Last Year Used as Pre-lottery Yeaz
Year-6 Year-5 Year-4 Year-3 Year-2 Year-1
est. t-stat est. t-stat est. t-stat est. t-stat est. t-stat est. t-stat
Yeaz-5 -0.1 [-0.0]
Yeaz-4 -1.1 [-0.5] -2.1 [-1.0]
Year-3 -0.3 [-0.1] -1.6 [-0.7] 1.9 (1.0]
Year-2 -1.3 [-0.6] -2.0 [-0.9] 0.6 [0.3] 1.0 (0.5]
Year-1 -1.9 [-0.7] -2.0 (-0.8] o.l [o.l] o.s [0.3] 2.8 [1.1]
Year 0 -2.7 [-1.0] -1.8 [-0.7] -0.6 (-0.3] 0.1 [0.1] 2.5 (0.9] 2.3 (0.8]
Yearfl -3.9 [-1.4] -3.5 [-1.3] -3.3 [-1.4] -2.5 (-1.1] -0.8 [-0.3] 1.2 [0.4]
Year-I-2 -2.5 [-0.9] -0.9 [-0.3] -1.1 [-0.4] -0.5 [-0.2) 1.0 [0.3] 3.0 [1.0]
Yeart3 -2.4 [-0.8] -0.7 [-0.2] -1.2 [-0.4] -0.5 [-0.2] 0.6 [0.2] 2.5 [0.8]
Year-F4 -2.1 [-0.7] -0.2 (-0.1] -0.5 [-0.2] -0.0 [-0.0] 1.6 [0.5] 2.8 [0.8]
Yeart5 -3.2 [-1.1] -2.3 [-0.8) -1.7 [-0.6] -1.5 [-0.6] 0.4 [0.1] 0.6 [0.2]
Yeazt6 -1.2 [-0.4] 0.8 ( 0.3] 0.9 [ 0.3] 0.9 [ 0.3] 2.8 (0.9] 3.3 [1.0]
39~able 12: WINNERS SAMPLE (N-237~, SENSITIVITY CHECKS ON LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES OF EFFECT













Last Year Used as Pre-lottery Year
Year-6 Year-5 Year-4 Year-3 Year-2 Year-1
est. t-stat est. t-stat est. t-stat est. t-stat est. t-stat est. t-stat
0.3 [0.4]
1.2 [1.3] 0.9 [1.4]
1.1 [1.1] 0.9 [1.1] 0.2 [0.2]
1.1 [0.9] 0.8 (0.8] o.l [o.l] -o.o [-o.l]
o.s [0.7] 0.7 [o.s] -o.o (-o.o] -o.l [-o.l] -o.ol [-o.l]
0.2 [ o.l] -o.l [-o.o] -o.s [-0.5] -0.8 [-0.7] -0.8 [-0.7] -0.7 [-o.s]
-2.6 [-1.6] -2.8 [-1.9] -3.3 [-2.4] -3.5 [-2.7] -3.4 [-2.8] -3.4 [-2.9]
-3.3 [-1.9] -3.5 [-2.3] -4.0 [-2.7] -4.1 [-2.9] -4.1 [-2.9] -4.1 [-3.0]
-4.2 (-2.5] -4.4 [-2.9] -4.8 [-3.1] -4.9 [-3.4] -4.9 [-3.4] -4.9 [-3.4]
-5.8 [-3.2] -6.0 [-3.6] -6.3 (-3.7) -6.4 [-3.9] -6.4 [-3.9] -6.3 (-3.9]
-4.0 [-2.4] -4.3 (-2.7] -4.7 [-3.OJ -4.8 (-3.1] -4.8 [-3.1] -4.8 [-3.2J
-4.7 [-2.8] -4.9 [-3.1] -5.2 [-3.3) -5.3 [-3.5] -5.3 (-3.5] -5.3 [-3.5]
40-aUle 13: WINNERS SAMPLE (N-237), SENSITIVITY CHECKS ON PROPENSITY SCORE ESTIMATES OF
~.FFECT OF WINNING ~óO,O00 VERSUS ~15,000 ON SOCIAL SECURITY EARNINGS
Last Yeaz Used es Pre-lottery Year
Yeaz-6 Year-5 Yeaz-4 Year-3 Year-2 Year-1
est. t-stat est. t-stat est. t-stat eat. t-stat est. t-stat est. t-stat
Year-5 0.3 [0.2]
Year-4 1.2 [0.8] 2.0 [1.2]
Year-3 l.o [o.s] 1.7 [l.o] 0.2 [o.l]
Year-2 o.s [o.s] 1.3 [0.7] o.l [o.l] o.l (a.l]
Year-1 0.6 [0.3] 1.2 [0.6] -0.6 [-0.3] 0.0 [0.0] -0.7 (-0.4]
Year 0 0.2 [ 0.1] 0.6 [ 0.3J -1.0 [-0.5] -1.2 [-0.6] -1.4 (-0.7] -2.7 [-1.4J
Yeartl -1.8 [-0.9] -1.5 [-0.7] -3.2 (-1.6] -3.5 [-1.6] -3.7 (-1.8] -5.1 [-2.5)
Yearf2 -2.2 (-1.0] -2.1 [-1.0] -3.6 (-1.8] -4.1 (-1.9] -4.2 [-2.0] -5.3 (-2.5]
Yearf3 -2.9 [-1.4) -3.1 [-1.4] -4.3 [-2.2J -4.5 (-2.1] -4.7 [-2.3] -5.6 [-2.7]
Yearf4 -4.8 [-2.2] -4.7 [-2.0] -5.9 [-2.7] -6.3 [-2.6) -6.3 [-2.8] -7.4 [-3.3]
Year-4-5 -3.0 [-1.5] -2.8 [-1.3] -4.1 [-2.1J -4.7 [-2.2J -4.7 [-2.3] -5.6 [-2.7]






INTRODUCTION: This survey is about how winning a Lottery prize
has affected your life. It will take about 25 minutes to complete. All the
information you give will be usedfor research purposes only and your
responses will be kept completely confidential.
Any questions that ask about your 'spouse'should be interpreted broadly
to refer to any partner with whom you live whether or not you are
marriet~
Pleaseprint neatly using black ink
Date survey completed:
Tl:isfirst group of questions is about your background:
1. Your date of birth
2. Your gender (please circle one) male female
3. Your race (optional, circle one)
White (iocluding Hispanic)
Black





4. Years of óigh school completed (circle one) 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
5. Years of college completed (circle one) 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
6. What were you doiug most of last week? (circle one)
working with a job but not at work looking for work
keepiag house going to school unable to work retired
other (please specify)
7. Your curreot occupation (please state)
S. In a typical week, how msny hours per week do you currently work?
9. What was your current spouse doing most of last week? (circle one)
working with s job but oot at work looking forwork
keeping house going to school uoable to work retired
other (please specify)
TR721
4310. Please complete thc following tablc showing your children's ages and how rouch schooling they have
completed.
The table also asks you to estimate how rouch (if any) you spcnt on each child's high school, college, and
graduate education.
Please give a total dollar figure and include any tuition, fees, room, and board that you paid. (Exclude
money from other sources such as scholarships and grants.)
ear o ears o ~g ota amount ears o ota amount ota amount
birth school you spent on college you spent on you spent on
completed private high completed college tuition, graduate
(0-4) school tuition, (0-4) fees 8c school tuition,
















11. Do you own or rent your home? (circle one) own rent
12. If renter, approximate monthly rent
TR721
4413. The following table asks you for some intormation on your assets, including any cars, real estate,
homes, or businesses that you own. Your assets also include any investments that you hold auch as bank
accounts, stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and pension plans.
The table asks you to value each of these assets. In each case, please try to give a rough dollar figure
(your best guess) of the vslue. In certain cases, the table asks if you have any debt or mortgages on the
asset.
It you do not have any of a particular asset, please write in S0. If there is no debt or mortgage on the
asset, please write in á0 in the appropriate box. Do notto leave any blanks in the table. Ifyou do not know







pnmary ome an prope
o er omes or rea es a e suc as vaca on
óomes)
au omo r es
usmesses mc . ur mg, prope e c.
any o er commercra prope suc as ren a
real estate)
s, p ans, p ans, , or
employer sponsored retirement plans
not apprca e
savrngs accoun or s not app rca e
o er stoc , on s, an mutus un not app rca e
r e rnsurance noJ app rca e
o er ma~or asse ,
-- ~
14. Considering your and your spouse's total after-ta: income this yesr, what portion will you save or
invest this year and next year? (please give a percentage)
This Year Next Year
TR721
45During 1986 you won a Lottery prize of ~100-~5,000 playing
Megabucks. The following questions concern your situation at the time
you won this Lotterv prize.
I5. Around 1986, what were you doing during a typical week? (circle one)
working keeping house going to school retired
other (please specify)
16. Your occupation during 1986 (please state)
17. During the period bejore you won the Lottery prize (in 1986), how many Megabucks tickets did you
typically buy per week?
Megabucks tickets
18. Where did you Iive at the time you won the lottery prize (i.e.1986)? (city name and zipcode) (example:
Cambridge, MA 01138)
19. At the time you won the lottery prize (1986) did you own or rent your home? (circle one)
own rent
20. In 1986 how many years of schooling had you completed (Don't include any schooling completed
after 1986):
high school (circle one) college (circle one)
0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
TR721
4621. Your marital status in 1986 (circle ooe)
married widowed divorced separated never married
22. Number oftimes you got divorced or separated AFI'ER 1986?
(circle one)
0 1 2 3 4
23. Are you generally óappy? (circle one) no
Finally, please sign the white form from Social Securiry and return it
with your completed survey. Thank you very much for your
participation. Pleasereturn the survey, the SocialSecuriryform and the
slipfor your season's ticket to Megabucks in the envelope provided
zx7z1
47APPENDIX B: THE PROPENSITY SCORE
One of the procedures we use to adjust for pre-lottery differences is based on the propen-
sity score methodology. This methodology was originally developed by Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1983a, 1983b, 1985). It was recently applied by Dehejia and Wahba ( 1998) to the
data originally analyzed by Lalonde (1985).13 Dehejia and Wahba find that with the Lalonde
data the propensity score approach is much more succesful than any of the alternatives con-
sidered by Lalonde in replicating the experimental results in an evaluation of a job training
program. In particular its success is in dealing with comparison groups that differ substan-
tially in a number of dimensions when least squazes adjustment rely heavily on linearity.
In this appendix we describe briefly the application of this methodology to the problem at
hand.
Using the potential outcome notation, (Rubin, 1974, Holland,.1986), let Y(0) and Y(1)
be the potential outcomes under the two levels oí the treatment, in our application "losing"
and "winning", respectively. Furthermore let T be a binary indicator for the treatment re-
ceived, T E {0, 1}, and let Y be the realized outcome, Y- T. Y(1) -{- (1 -T) .Y(0). Finally,
let X be a vector of pre-treatment variables. In our application this vector includes back-
ground characteristics such as age at the time of winning, gender, education, and earnings
in yeats prior to winning. The key assumption is the unconfoundedness assumption that
conditional on the pre-treatment vaziables assignment to the treatment is independent of
the two potential outcomes:
T 1 Y(0), Y(1) X. (1)
In Appendix C we eva]uate the plausibility of this assumption in the current application.
The unconfoundedness assumption validates comparisons for units with the same value of
130ther applications in economics include Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998), and Hotz, Imbens
and Mortimer (1999).
48the pre-treatment variables:
E[Y~T - 1, X] - E[YIT - ~, x] - E(Y(1) - Y(t))IX]. (2)
To get the population average of the causal effect E(Y(1) - Y(0)] can then be obtained by
averaging the within-cell average over the distribution of X:
E[Y(1) - Y(0)] - E[E[Y(1) - Y(0)~X]]. (3)
The practical problem is that with many pre-treatment variables it ia not feasible to divide
the sample into subsamples with the exact value of the pre-treatment variables. With a sin-
gle, continuous pre-treatment variable this is of course not possible either, but in that case
one can coarsen the pre-treatment variable and ignore the variation of the pre-treatment
variable within coarser cells. The difficulty in doing this with many pre-treatment variables
is in finding a metric that allows comparisons of units with differences in many pre-trestment
variables. This is where the propensity score enters the analysis. I~et e(X) - Pr(T - 1~X)
be the conditional probability of receiving the treatment, or the propensity score. Rosen-
baum and Rubin (1983) show that if assignment is independent of the potential outcomes
conditional on the pre-treatment variables, it is aLso independent conditional on the propen-
sity score:
T 1 Y(0),Y(1) X-~ T 1 Y(0),Y(1) I e(X).
We implement this methodology, following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), and Dehejia
and Wahba (1998) as follows: First we estimate a logistic regression of the binary treatment
indicator on a vector of functions of the pre-treatment variables. Given the estimated coeffi-
cients from this logistic regression we calculate the estimated propensity score é(x) for each
unit.
Second, we calculate the minimum value of the estimated propensity score for the treated
units and discard all control units with an estimated propensity score less than this value.
49Similarly we discard all treated units with an estimated propensity score larger than the
maximum value of the estimated propensity score for the control units. This step was of
great importance in the Dehejia-Wahba application t.o the Lalonde data because of the large
differences in average pre-treatment variables between the treated and control units.
Third, we then divide the sample into five subsamples, based on the quintiles of the
empirical distribution of the estimated propensity score of the units with T- 1. Within these
subsamples we estimate the average treatment effect by ordinary least squares using three
of the pre-lottery variables and an indicator for the group. The three control variables are
age at the time of winning, social security earnings in the last year prior to winning, and an
indicator for these earnings being positive. The choice for these variables was based on prior
beliefs that these were among the ones most highly correlated with the outcome variables.
The estimated within-block average treatment effect is the estimate of the coefficient on the
group indicator.
Finally we weight these subsample average treatment effects by the fraction of treated
units in each sample to get an estimate of the population average treatment effect.
We apply this methodology to both the small-winners~losers and the big-winners~small-
winners samples. Table 9 presents the estimates of the two logistic regressions.14 For the
small-winners~losers sample we use as pre-treatment variables year won, number of tickets
bought, age, years of high school, years of college, an indicator for working at the time of
winning, an indicator for male, earnings for each of the six years preceeding winning, and
indicators for positive earnings in each of those six years. For the big-winners~small-winners
sample we use the same pre-treatment variables with the one modificiation that we only use
earnings and indicator for positive earnings for the one year prior to winning the lottery.
The reason for using only one year of earnings data for the big-winners~small-winners sample
14This is for the basic samples with 259 losers, 93 small winners and 144 big winners. For the calculations
involving additional variables the samples aze sometimes smaller and the logistic regressions can be slightly
diHerent.
50is that the distributions of pre-treatment variables are much closer for treated and control
units in that sample. We carried out a number of tests to support this, also reported in
Table 13. First we included all earnings and indicators for positive earnings and tested
the hypothesis that all slope coefficients were equal to zero. For the small-winners~losers
sample this leads to a statistic of 177.3. Under the nul] hypothesis this statistic should have
a X2 distribution with 19 degrees of freedom. For the big-winners~small-winners sample
the statistic is 24.0, suggesting the hypothesis should not be rejected at conventional levels.
Second, we test whether the six years of pre-lottery earnings contribute to the propensity
score given the other characteristics. Here the statistics, under the null hypothesis from a
X2 distribution with 12 degrees of freedom, are 17.7 and 5.0 respectively. Finally we test
whether the first five years of earnings contribute anything to the propensity score given the
final pre-lottery year. Here the statistics under the null hypothesis from a X~ distribution
with 10 degrees of freedom, are 7.4 and 3.9 respectively. On the basis of these test-statistics
and other calculations we decided on the specification of the propensity scores.
Given the estimates of the propensity score for the small-winner~loser sample 11 (out of
93) small winners were discarded with estimated propensity scores larger than the largest
estimated propensity score for losers. Similarly 104 (out of 259) losers were discarded with
propensity scores smaller than the smallest propensity score for small winners. In the big-
winners~small-winners sample only 17 big winners were discarded, again suggesting the
balance is much better in this sample.
In Tables 4 and 5 one can compare the least squares and propensity score estimates for the
small-winners~losers sample. The estimates are generally very close with the standard errors
for the least squares estimates much smaller than those for the propensity score estimates.
This can be seen very clearly in Figures 4 and 5 where the solid lines give the 95oI'o confidence
intervals based on propensity score estimates and the dashed lines the corresponding intervals
based on least squares estimates. For the big-winner~small-winner sample the differences
between least squares and propensity score estimates were much smaller, as evidenced by
51Figures 6 and 7, and this is the reason we omitted propensity score estimates for these
samples in the body of the paper.
52APPENDIX C: SENSITIVITY OF ADJUSTMENT PROCEDURES
In this appendix we discuss the sensitivity of the estimates to the choice of adjustment
procedures and pre-lottery variables. Like Heckman and Hotz (1989) we exploit the presence
of multiple years of pre-lottery earnings to evaluate the adequacy of short earnings histo-
ries to adjust pre-lottery difference. The importance of earnings histories in adjusting for
pre-treatment differences has long been the focus of much discussion. See, among others,
Ashenfelter and Card (1978), Card and Sullivan (1989), and Dehejia and Wahba (1998).
First consider the small-winners~losers sample. In the body of the paper we report results
based on propensity score and least squares estimates using as pre-lottery variables earnings
and indicator for positive earnings for six years prior to winning the lottery. Here we report
estimates based on adjusting for only the first K years of these six years of pre-lottery
earnings, both in levels and with an indicator for positive earnings. In Table 10 the first
two columns reports least squares estimates based on adjusting for the same background
characteristics as before (year won, age, years high school, years college, working then, male)
but using only earnings six years prior to winning the lottery. We report estimates using
earnings from five years prior, to six years subsequent, to winning the lottery. We are
interested in these estimates for two reasons. For the five years prior to winning the lottery
the true average causal effect is by definition equal to zero. We wish to see whether least
squares estimates are consistent with these known true values. In addition we wish to check
whether the estimates for the years subsequent to winning the l~ttery are sensitive to the
exclusion of the other pre-lotttery earnings. In the first column we see that estimates for
several of the pre-lottery years are significantly different from zero, suggesting that least
squares adjustment does not adequately adjust for the pre-lottery differences. The next pair
of columns reports results based on adjusting for the first two years of pre-Iottery earnings.
The estimates for the remaining pre-lottery years are closer to zero, suggesting that with
two years least squares adjustment works better. As we adjust for more pre-lottery years,
53the significance of the remaining pre-lottery years goes down, and in addition the estimates
for the post-lottery years stabilize.
In Table 11 we report propensity score estimates for the same samples and combinations
of pre-lottery variables. Now estimates for pre-lottery years are always statistically close to
zero.
In Tables 12 and 13 we report least squares and propensity score estimates for the big-
winners~small-winners samples. Here the least squares estimates perform very well even
adjusted for only few years of pre-lottery earnings. This is why in the body of the paper we
do not report propensity score estimates for this sample.
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